The lede
Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI installs a credential stealer and backdoor
SafeDep
A single injected line in the sdist's maturin config — `data = "cook"` — got three files into all seven wheels, and because one of them is a `.pth` file the stealer ran on every Python process start on the host, not only the ones that imported litellm: SSH keys, cloud creds, CI secrets, AI tool tokens, browser passwords, and the provider keys sitting in a LiteLLM proxy's own database, encrypted out to a lookalike domain, with an hourly daemon pulling fresh code from a server address read out of a GitHub file. The part to sit with is the delivery: the attacker had three developers' GitHub CLI credentials, lifted from the logs of an internet-exposed internal LiteLLM deployment, and used an owner token to point the private release workflow at a lookalike repo — so the official pipeline built, signed and published it, and the Docker tags including `latest` carried it for two and a half hours.